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It is hard to grapple with an existing social order, but 
harder still to have to posit one that does not exist. 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal 
1.1  Introduction 
The choice of  a unit of taxation is a fundamental one in any tax system. 
In most cases, this boils down to whether the tax schedule will be applied 
to the income of the individual or that of  the family. Since the personal 
income tax was introduced into the United States in 1913,  the selection of 
the taxable unit  has been  a  source of  controversy.’ The choice has 
fluctuated over time, and even now there is no strong societal consensus. 
Currently, single and married people face different tax schedules, with 
the tax liability of married individuals being based upon the couple’s joint 
income.*  Consequently, tax burdens change with marital status, although 
one cannot predict a priori whether tax liabilities will increase or decrease 
when an individual marries. The answer depends in part upon the close- 
ness of  the incomes of the spouses. The general tendency is that the closer 
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1. The pros and cons of  various choices are discussed by Rosen (1977), Brazer (1980), 
and Munnell (1980). 
2. The family was established by statute as the principal unit of  taxation in 1948. The 
system of separate schedules for singles and marrieds was introduced in 1969. 
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the incomes, the more likely that tax liabilities will increase (Munnell 
1980). 
This state of  affairs has been criticized for a number of reasons. Some 
observers, noting that the tax system often provides financial disincen- 
tives for  marriage,  have  argued  that the current  regime encourages 
immorality (Washington Post 1979). Economists have tended to focus on 
possible inefficiencies induced when tax liability is based upon family 
income (“joint filing”). As Boskin and Sheshinski (1979) note, since the 
labor supply elasticities of husbands and wives differ, economic efficiency 
would be enhanced if their earned incomes were taxed at different rates. 
Yet under a system of joint filing, spouses face the same marginal tax rate 
on the last dollar. A closely related criticism is that the current tax regime 
tends to discourage married women from entering the marketplace. This 
is because under joint filing, the wife’s marginal tax rate is a function of 
the husband’s  earning^.^ 
In the light of these and other criticisms, a number of suggestions have 
been made to reform the tax treatment of  the family. None of  these 
proposals has been accompanied by careful estimates of their effects on 
income distribution, revenue collections, and labor supply. The purpose 
of  the present paper is to provide this information. 
The vehicle for our analysis is the TAXSIM file of the National Bureau 
of  Economic Re~earch.~  TAXSIM contains virtually all the information 
from a sample of 2,339 tax returns filed in 1974.5  (The returns, however, 
are “aged” so that all magnitudes reported are in 1979 levels.)6  The file 
includes information on the taxable earnings of  both spouses, interest, 
dividends, capital gains, rents, etc. Our basic plan is  to simulate the 
effects of alternative tax regimes by computing for each the associated tax 
liabilities. In this way, one can determine the gainers and losers as the tax 
system is modified. 
An important complication arises because much economic behavior 
depends upon the tax system, so that pretax values of  (say) earnings may 
be a function of  the tax regime. More specifically, a number of  econo- 
metric studies have indicated that although husbands’ hours of work are 
independent  of  the tax  system,  the labor force behavior  of  married 
3.  This argument implicitly assumes that a husband’s labor supply is not sensitive to tax 
rate changes generated by his wife’s earnings. 
4.  TAXSIM is described in detail in Feldstein and Frisch (1977). In the version used 
here, neither state and local nor social security taxes are taken into account. 
5.  The file is a stratified sample from the Treasury Tax Model; it includes one return in 
eighty for returns showing no wife’s labor income and one return in twenty with positive 
wife’s labor income. The Tax Model is itself stratified with weights ranging from one to 
several thousand. 
6.  In order to bring  all figures to  1979 levels we  increase all dollar amounts by  the 
proportional change in taxable income from 1974 to 1979, and to increase the number of 
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women is quite responsive to the net wage (see e.g. Rosen 1976 or Hall 
1973).’ Thus, ignoring the labor supply response of  married women is 
likely to lead to biased estimates of  the effects of  tax reform proposals. 
Our simulations explicitly incorporate  endogenous work decisions for 
wives. 
Unfortunately, even a complete set of  variables relating to a house- 
hold’s tax situation does not include all of  the information needed  to 
predict  the effects of  taxes  on labor  supply.  For example,  standard 
theoretical considerations suggest that an important determinant of labor 
supply is the wage rate, but since it is not entered on the tax return, the 
wage is absent from TAXSIM. Section 1.2 of  this paper consists of  a 
careful discussion  of  the statistical issues surrounding the problem  of 
imputing such missing data. The reader who lacks interest in this metho- 
dological question may wish to skip to section 1.3, which explains the 
behavioral assumptions built into the simulations. Section 1.4 contains 
the results. The alternative tax regimes considered run the gamut from 
eliminating joint filing altogether,  to  retaining joint filing but granting tax 
subsidies to secondary workers.  A concluding  section  includes some 
caveats and suggestions for future research. 
1.2  Methodological Issues 
A behavioral simulation requires data on  individuals’ tax situations and 
on their economic and demographic characteristics. The tax information 
is required to make careful predictions of  the revenue implications of 
alternative tax regimes. The economic and demographic information is 
needed to estimate the impact of  tax changes upon economic behavior. 
The fundamental methodological  problems of  this study are conse- 
quences of  the fact that no publicly available data set has all this informa- 
tion. The sources typically used by economists to estimate behavioral 
equations have virtually no federal income tax data (see e.g. Institute for 
Social Research 1974). On the other hand, data sets that are rich in tax 
information tend to tell us little else about the members of the sample. 
For example, because individuals do not report wage rates and hours of 
work on their federal income tax returns, TAXSIM has no information 
on these crucial magnitudes.  Clearly, then, one must  bring together 
information from (at least) two different data sources in order to  perform 
tax simulations with endogenous labor supply responses. 
A popular technique for combining information is statistical matching.* 
The first step in  this procedure is to isolate a set of  variables that is 
common to both data sets. Then a search is made to determine which 
7.  The evidence is reviewed more carefully in section  1.3 below. 
8. It has been used, for example, to  create the Brookings MERGE file. See Pechman 
and Okner (1974). 10  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
observations of each data set are “close” on the basis of these  variable^.^ 
The close observations are pooled in order to form a “synthetic” observa- 
tion, which is then treated as if  it were generated by a single behavioral 
unit. 
In addition to suffering  from statistical problems,’o  the matching proce- 
dure is enormously expensive in computer time for data sets of  even 
moderate size. In this section we develop an imputation procedure that 
we think dominates matching on both statistical and cost grounds. We 
begin by discussing the general problem of predicting tax revenue collec- 
tions in a simulation model with endogenous behavior. This turns out to 
provide a useful framework for generating a rigorous data imputation 
technique, which is done in the second part of  this section. In the third 
part, the procedure is applied to the problem of estimating missing wage 
data. 
1.2.1  Predicting Tax Revenues 
Let y be a vector of variables endogenous to the tax system. Included 
are  items such as taxable income, which depends directly upon provisions 
of  the tax code, as well as variables like pretax earnings, which depend 
upon the tax system only to the extent that the latter influences economic 
behavior.  Let x  be  a vector  of  exogenous variables such as age and 
wealth. If  the tax code at a given time is represented by the parameter B, 
then we can think of  the tax system as a function t(x,y,  B)  which deter- 
mines the amount of taxes owed by an individual given both the relevant 
exogenous and endogenous variables. Our problem is to determine how 
revenues change when there is a change from the current tax regime, 
denoted B’,  to some new tax regime, B”. 
Call the joint distribution of  the exogenous and endogenous variables 
in the population f(x,y(B’).  Then total tax revenue under the current 
regime B’ is 
(2.1)  W’)  = NS*S,t(x,y,B’)~(x,ylB’)dy  dx , 
where N is the total number of  taxpaying units. 
formed. An obvious alternative to (2.1) is its discrete analogue, 
The analytic integration implied by  (2.1) cannot in  practice be per- 
m’)  = .i  t(  x.  1, y.  I, B’)P, ,  (2.2)  r=l 
where yi  and  xi  (i = 1, .  . . ,  Z)  are Z  sample observations from the universe 
of N taxpaying units and P, is the sample weight of the ith observation. (In 
the absence of  deliberate stratification,  pl: = N/Z for all i.) 
Under the tax regime B” tax revenues are 
9. Criteria for doing the matching are discussed by Kadane (1978) and Barr and Turner 
10.  These are explained by Sims (1978). 
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T(B”)  = Njxjy  t(x,y,B”)f(x,ylB”)dy  dx  . 
Unfortunately, even knowledge of f(x,ylB’)  does not in general give us 
f(x,ylB”), the joint distribution of  x  and y under the new regime. Only 
with  the restrictive  assumption that y is inelastic with  respect to the 
change in tax regimes can we estimate new tax revenues as 
I 
QB)  =  2  t(x,y,B”)Pz .  (2.4)  i=  1 
For changes in tax regimes of  the sort being analyzed in this paper, the 
exogeneity assumption is untenable. 
In order to predict taxes under B”,  the first step is to specify a behav- 
ioral relation that gives y as some function of x,  the tax code, and an error 
term independent of  x: 
(2.5a) 
(2.5b) 
y;  = y(x,,B’) + u; , 
y;= y(x.  19 ,,,)  + u’!  I? 
where ujis the random error for the ith individual under regime Bf  and u; 
is defined  analogously.  (The errors have  means of  zero.) Note  that 
independence between uf and uyis not assumed; indeed, one expects that 
typically they will  conceal a substantial individual “fixed effect”  and 
hence be correlated. 
If  we substitute equation (2.5b) into (2.3), we find 
(2.6)  T(B)  = NjxS,[jUyr(x,y(x,B)  + u;,B”)+(u;)duJ 
f(B)  = N  r=l  ,2  [Jqt(Xi,y(Xi,B”)  + u;,B”)+(u”)du;]P, . 
xf(x,ylB’)dy dx  7 
where +(u;) is the density of  uy. The discrete analogue to (2.6) is 
I 
(2.7) 
If  the  distribution of  u; is known,”  then  (2.7) consists entirely  of 
observables. It turns out, however, that both defining  +(u;) and integrat- 
ing over uycan be avoided by taking advantage of a simple trick. Define 
(2.8)  ~;=Y(x~,B”)  + (yi-y(~i,B‘))  . 
In words, j;is the expected value of y under the B  regime plus the error 
term associated with regime B‘.  If, as might reasonably be expected, uf 
and u;are  highly correlated, then 9;should be a better estimator of y;than 
y(xi,B”), because the latter ignores the error in the behavioral equation. 
More precisely, 9;  and y;  have identical distributions under the assump- 
tion  that  uf is  drawn  from  the same distribution  as u;, a  fairly mild 
condition. These considerations suggest the following estimator: 
11. For example, u:‘ might be  the normal error from a regression, whose mean and 
variance are computed along with the regression coefficients. 12  Daniel R. FeenbergIHarvey S. Rosen 
I 
1=1  T(B”)  = N  c  t(x,,j:’)E ,  (2.9) 
(2.10) 
which can also be written (using the definition of  9;)  as 
?(W)  = N  C  t(xr,y(xl,B”) + ui,B”)P, . 
I 
r=l 
Since yyand jyhave the same distribution, f(Bff)  is an unbiased estimator 
of total revenue. 
It is useful to  compare (2.10) with (2.7). In effect, the integral over urof 
(2.7) has been replaced in (2.10) by a sample mean from an identical 
distribution. (Of course, the sample mean is calculated with one  observa- 
tion, but it is nevertheless an unbiased estimator, and hence performs the 
same function as a mean calculated over several observations.) 
f(B”)  should be contrasted with  an estimator which  uses only the 
predicted value of  y:’ for each observation, 
I 
r=1  qB”)  = N  c  t(xr,y(xl,Bn)  ,B”), .  (2.11) 
One expects that T(Bf’)  will be less satisfactory than f(W)  because in 
general the distribution of  the expectation of a random variable differs 
from the distribution of  the variable itself, if  only in having a smaller 
variance. Only if  the tax code and labor supply functions are linear will 
(2.11) be equivalent to (2.10). 
To summarize: We have carefully developed a method for estimating 
tax revenues under alternative tax regimes. Similar procedures  have been 
used before (see e.g. Feldstein and Taylor 1976), but with a more intui- 
tive statistical justification. Of  course, the discussion so far has ignored 
the possibility that some variables in the x  or y vectors may be missing 
from the TAXSIM file. The theory we have developed in this section, 
however, turns out to provide a useful framework for thinking about data 
information problems. 
1.2.2  Imputing Baseline Data: Theory 
Most of the plausible theories of  labor supply suggest that it is neces- 
sary to know something about individuals’ wage rates and hours of work 
in  order to predict  how  alternative  tax regimes  affect revenues.  But 
federal tax returns include only the product of  hours and the wage rate, 
that is,  earnings. In this  section we  show how  external information 
concerning the joint distribution of  earnings and hours can be used in 
conjunction with tax return data to impute the missing variables. 
For expositional purposes, we specialize the model developed in sec- 
tion  1.2.1 above. Let the vector y  of  endogenous variables have two 
elements, e (earnings) and rn (total taxable income).” Let the vector x of 
12.  We ignore for the moment the fact that the household may have more than one 
earner. 13  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
exogenous variables consist of one element, w,  the pretax wage rate. The 
tax calculator is then t(e,m,  w,B). 
Although TAXSIM has e and m,  it does not have w.  A number of data 
sets have information on e and w,  but not m. Because there is no data set 
which includes e, m, and w, f(e,y,  w(B’)  cannot be inferred straightfor- 
wardly. But if we are willing to make some additional assumptions,f(-)  is 
estimable. 
The key assumption is that m and w,  conditional on e and B, are 
independent. This seems quite reasonable in that once we know earnings, 
knowledge of  the wage probably contributes little to predicting taxable 
income. Of  course, the independence assumption is not necessarily true. 
It might be the case, for example, that high nonlabor incomes are associ- 
ated with high reservation wages, ceteris paribus. This would generate 
conditional dependence of  m and w,  even given e. In this context, it 
should also be noted that in actual application there are several variables 
common to both data sets. Increasing the number  of  variables upon 
which independence is conditioned  makes the assumption even more 
reasonable. 
Rewriting equation (2.1) for our special case, we have 
(2.12)  T(B’)  = Njwjmje  t(e,m,w,B’)f(e,m,wlB’)de  dm  dw . 
Taking advantage of  the usual identities concerning the distributions of 
independent variables,13  (2.12) can be rewritten as 
(2.13) 
Now, S,,,f(*IB)dw  is the distribution of earnings and taxable income, and is 
estimable from the TAXSIM file. S,f(-IB)dm  is the distribution of wages 
and earnings, and may be estimated from any data set with information 
on both w and e. Finally, 
Smjwf(.IB)dw dm 
is the distribution of earnings and may be estimated from either or both 
files. Therefore T(B)  is identified by the existing unmatched files. 
There still remains, of  course, the problem of  estimating the relevant 
distribution functions. As noted above, it is impractical to find closed- 
form expressions for  f (@) and its marginal distributions. Sims (1978) has 
suggested that e, m, and w  space be partitioned into a large number of 
cells, and that the marginal cell counts be used as estimated of  the three 
integrals overf(.IB). However, given that in our problem we are dealing 
13. See, for example, DeGroot (1975, p. 119). 14  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
with a number of  continuous variables,  this approach does not seem 
operational. 
We therefore propose the following alternative. Let (ej,mj;  i = 1, . . . , 
Z)  be a set of  Zobservations from TAXSIM. Then the discrete probability 
analogue to equation (2.13) is 
where the term enclosed in brackets is the expected value of taxes owed 
by  the ith taxpayer, given the joint distribution of  wage rates with the 
other variables.  (Note that  P;:  plays the role that  S,f(.IB’)dw  had  in 
(2.13).  ) 
The ratio 
that appears in (2.14) is just the distribution of wage rates conditioned on 
earnings and B’. As noted above, it can be estimated from a number of 
available data sets. It appears, then, that the only stumbling block to 
evaluating (2.14) is integrating over w.  A Monte Carlo approach seems 
promising here.I4  Essentially, this procedure involves the replacement of 
the integral over w with a sample mean. 
We proceed more formally by  defining 
Then (2.14) can be rewritten 
(2.15)  QBf)  = NJw .i  qj(w)dw . 
r=l 
For any  density function g(w),  (2.15) is 
(2.16) 
Observe that ifw  is distributed as g(w),  then (2.16) is the expected value 
Suppose that we have available a device for producing random num- 
bers with distribution g(w). Let Gi,  be the jth such random number 
generated for the ith individual. Then the basic Monte Carlo strategy 
suggests replacing integral (2.16) with 
of C!=  1  (qdwYg(w)). 
14.  For a general discussion of  Monte Carlo techniques, see Shreider (1966) 15  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
(2.17) 
where J is the number of random drawings. 
given earnings. Then (2.17) becomes 
Suppose now that we let g(w)  be the conditional distribution of  wages 
(2.18) 
X  Srnf(.IB‘)dm  Pi  . 
g(wij )SrnSwf(.IBr)dw dm 
When the definition of  g(*)  is substituted into (2.18), it collapses 
(2.18‘) 
To appreciate the meaning of  (2.18’) it is useful to contrast it to the 
alternative expression 
(2.19) 
where E(wilei,mi)  is the conditional expectation of wi.  To compute f(B’), 
we must take the average of Jvalues  drawn from the conditional distribu- 
tion of  w,  while for S(B’),  w is imputed using simply the conditional 
mean. To the extent that t(.) is nonlinear, S(B’)  yields biased estimates. 
The only remaining question is how to choose  J,  the number of random 
drawings from the distribution. A careful examination of  this question 
would require optimally trading off the (substantial) computational costs 
of increasing J against the efficiency gains from doing so. Such an exercise 
is beyond the scope of this paper. We settle upon J = 1  as an inexpensive 
solution that has all the desirable statistical properties of  (2.18’). 
We have come by  a rather indirect  route, then, to a rigorous yet 
straightforward solution to the problem of  imputing wage rates to the 
TAXSIM file. Using a separate data file, estimate a regression of the form 
w =  g(2)  +  E, where  2 is  a vector  of  variables  in  common between 
TAXSIM and the data set and E is a random error. Then for the ith 
observation in TAXSIM, impute the wage as g(ZJ +  ei,  where ei  is a 
random drawing from the distribution of  E. 
1.2.3  Imputing Baseline Data: Application to the Wife’s Wage 
We now apply our statistical theory to the problem of imputing wives’ 
wages.I5  The  first task is to select a suitable data set that includes the wage 
I 
r=l  S(B’)  = N .c t(ei,mi,E(wilei,mi))~  , 
15. Husbands’ wages are not required for reasons given in section  1.3 below. 16  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
rate.  The University  of  Michigan  Panel  Study of  Income  Dynamics 
(PSID) was chosen because it was the only data set we could locate which 
included both wage rate and annual income data for a sample from the 
general population. The much larger Current Population Survey (United 
States Department of Labor) asks for income in March and the wage rate 
in May; while these could in principle be matched, we did not attempt to 
do so. The National Longitudinal Survey (United States Department of 
Labor 1970) covers only specific age-groups. The major disadvantage of 
the PSID is the absence of  any families with very large incomes. While 
these families are relatively rare in the population, they are an important 
source of tax revenue. It would have been useful to have a recent data set 
in which the rich are oversampled, but none exists. 
The next step is to estimate with the PSID data a regression of  the 
wife’s wage on some function of  those variables that are common to the 
PSID and TAXSIM. The set of  common variables consists of: wife’s 
earnings, husband’s earnings, a dummy to indicate whether the wife is 
over sixty-five, and the number of exemptions. A regression of the wife’s 
wage rate on a set of variables that includes her earnings may at first seem 
rather strange. After all, since earnings is just the product of  wage rate 
and  hours  worked,  it  is  an  endogenous variable.  This  observation, 
although correct, is quite beside the point. The statistical theory  de- 
veloped in the preceding section dictates only that we describe the joint 
distribution of  the wage rate and the common variables, not that we 
estimate a valid structural equation. 
After some experimentation, we selected a function second-order in 
both husband’s and wife’s earnings. The results are presented in the 
column (1) of table 1-1. A glance at the table indicates that the standard 
errors of the earnings variables are somewhat large relative to the size of 
the coefficients. This is a consequence of multicollinearity among the five 
earnings variables and is not a cause for concern, because it does not 
render the predictions biased. 
The possibility remains that even given the common variables, other 
factors significantly  influence the wife’s wage. In order to  see whether this 
was the case, we augmented the list of  regressors with the following 
variables from the PSID: wife’s education, wife’s labor market experi- 
ence, wife’s race, and wife’s age. 
As can be seen from the results given in column (2) of table 1.1, except 
for years of education none of  the variables adds significantly to the 
explanatory power of the equation. Will, then, the fact that education is 
not available for the imputation process lead to an important bias in our 
calculations? We think that any such bias will be minimal. Education is, 
after all, not available in the tax model precisely because it is not required 
to calculate taxes. To the extent that education is correlated with some 17  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
Table  1.1  Wife’s Wage Regressions 
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(2.787  X 
1.734 X  lo-’ 



















(2.7699 x 10 -4) 











(  ,003302) 
(2.278  x  lo-’) 
-  .1363 
-  ,09957 
10.06 
1791 
Note:  Wage regressions are estimated  from PSID. Earnings variables are measured  in 
thousands of  dollars. Variables in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Dichotomous variables. 
variable in TAXSIM that is not in the PSID, there will be some bias, but it 
is reasonable to expect such correlations to be small. 
There turned out to be a problem with the first regression of table 1.1 
that led us to reject it as a basis for our wage imputations: the residuals 
were not homoscedastic. It was therefore difficult to specify the distribu- 
tion  of  the residuals,  a step which is required in order to assign the 
random component of  the imputed wage. To remedy this difficulty we 
estimated separate regressions for each of three earnings categories. (We 
did not investigate the possibility that the error variance might depend 
upon variables other than income.) These results, which are reported in 
table 1.2, provided a considerably more homogeneous set of  residuals 
within groups, although not of an identifiable distribution. Therefore the 
random  component  of  the wage imputation was found  by  making a 
random selection from the set of estimated residuals. The imputed wage, 18  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
Table 1.2  Wife’s Wage Regressions by  Earnings Class 






Wife’s earnings  x 
husband’s earnings 
Wife over 65 
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(.02599) 





(  .05  126) 
10.69 
703 
-  .3306 
-  ,1699 











-  ,1721 

















-  .OO1079 
-  .009877 
-  ,5405 
(1.2119) 
(.  1073) 
-  .lo34 
13.03 
295 
Note:  See footnotes to table 1.1. 
then, is the sum of  this residual  and the conditional expected mean 
estimated from the appropriate equation from table 1.2. 
Of  course, for nonworking  wives this procedure could not be  im- 
plemented because of  the absence of a wage variable to serve the depen- 
dent variable. Instead, a procedure was followed similar to that suggested 
by Hall (1973). We estimated for the sample of  working wives a regres- 
sion of the wage rate on husband’s income, number of dependents, and 
an over sixty-five dummy variable, and used the results to impute wages 
to the nonworkers. As is well known, this procedure does not correct for 
the possible effects of selectivity bias (see e.g. Heckman 1980). Given our 
paucity of  explanatory variables, it seemed to us pretentious to attempt 
this rather subtle correction. Moreover, Hausman (1980, pp. 47,48) has 
pointed  out that in cases like ours, the correction usually makes no 
practical difference anyway. 
1.3  Behavioral Assumptions 
We now turn to the question of how, given our figures on wages rates 
and hours of  work, we can simulate the effects of various tax changes on 
work effort and the distribution of family income. In effect, our task is to 
specify the function y(-)  of equation (2.5) that relates hours of work to 
exogenous variables and the tax code. The framework used is the stan- 19  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
I 
I 






T  Leisure 
Fig. 1.1 
dard microeconomic theory of  the leisure-income choice.I6 The theory 
views the hours-of-work decision as an outcome when the individual 
maximizes a utility function subject to a budget constraint. This suggests 
an obvious way to organize our exposition: in section 1.3.1  we discuss the 
budget constraint generated by the personal income tax system, and in 
section 1.3.2  we explain how preferences are modeled. 
1.3.1  The Budget Constraint 
Consider first the budget constraint faced by an untaxed individual with 
a wage  w  and unearned income I. The constraint can be represented 
graphically on a diagram with income plotted on the vertical axis and 
hours of  leisure on the horizontal. In figure 1.1,  if  the individual’s time 
endowment is OT hours, then the budget constraint is a straight line MN 
with slope -  o  and vertical intercept I(  = TN).  Behind the linear budget 
constraint are the assumptions that the fixed costs associated with work- 
ing are negligible and that the gross wage does not vary with hours of 
work. These assumptions are common to most studies of  labor supply. 
Although the consequences of relaxing them have been discussed,” there 
is no agreement on whether they are important empirically. In this study 
we retain the conventional assumption that the pretax budget constraint 
can be represented as a straight line. 
Killingsworth, and MaCurdy (1979). 
discusses a model in which full- and part-time workers receive different hourly wages. 
16. For a comprehensive discussion of  the theory, the reader is referred to  Heckman, 
17. Hausman (1980)  analyzes a model  with  fixed  costs of  work,  and Rosen (1976) 20  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
Assume now that the individual is subject to a proportional tax on both 
earned and unearned income. Then the effective budget constraint facing 
the individual in figure 1.1 is PQ,  with the tax rate being NPINT. Note 
that even with such a simple tax system, one would have to know both the 
uncompensated elasticity of  hours with  respect  to the wage and the 
income elasticity in order to predict the impact of  taxes upon hours of 
work. 
Of course, the United States tax system is progressive with respect to 
taxable income, not proportional.  As an individual’s income bracket 
changes, she generally faces a discrete increase in the marginal tax rate. 
This leads to a kinked  budget  constraint  like RSUVW in  figure  1.2. 
Observe that if the individual’s optimum is along (say) segment US,  then 
she behaves exactly as if optimizing along a linear budget constraint with 
the same slope as US but with intercept TR’.  This fact, which has been 
observed by Hall (1973) and others, is extremely useful, because it allows 
us to characterize the individual’s opportunities as a series of  straight 
lines. The distance  TR’ will be referred to as “effective” nonlabor in- 
come. 
Included in the tax code are a complicated set of  exemptions, deduc- 
tions, and credits. Conceptually, it is not difficult to include their effects 
in the budget constraint-all  that is required is that we be able to compute 
net income at any given number of  hours of  work. It should be noted, 
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actually lead to nonconvexities in the budget constraint. An important 
consequence of nonconvexities is that there may be several points at 
which indifference curves are tangent to the budget constraint. In theory, 
then, the utility function must be evaluated along each segment of  the 
budget constraint in order to find a global maximum. The specification of 
a complete utility function-not  just a labor supply curve-thus  becomes 
a necessity. 
1.3.2  The Utility Function 
In order to model preferences we must select both a functional form 
and specific numerical values for its parameters. One possibility is to 
choose a reasonable functional form and then estimate the parameters 
ourselves. The most obvious problem with this approach is that in the 
TAXSIM model, there are simply not enough data to estimate a convinc- 
ing labor supply function. As we have already noted, many of the impor- 
tant demographic and economic variables are absent. 
Another option is for us to do the estimation using a more appropriate 
data base and then assign the parameter values to the members of  the 
TAXSIM sample. After considerable thought, this option was rejected. 
The evidence indicates that the substantive results of labor supply studies 
are quite  sensitive to functional  specification and  econometric tech- 
nique.’*  It is therefore unlikely that anyone would have viewed our results 
as definitive. 
Instead, we choose to cull from the literature “consensus” estimates of 
the wage and unearned income elasticities. Then, assuming some specific 
form for the utility function and taking advantage of  duality theory, we 
work backward to find the implied utility function parameters. Instead of 
confining ourselves to one set of parameters, we use several in order to 
determine the impact upon our substantive results. We first discuss the 
functional form selected to characterize preferences  and then explain 
how its parameter values are set. 
Functional Form 
The standard static theory of labor supply behavior starts with a family 
utility function which depends upon family income and the amounts of 
leisure time consumed by each spouse. The labor supply of each spouse 
depends upon the net  wages of  both spouses and effective unearned 
income. Using several fairly reasonable assumptions, however, one can 
specify a family utility function with only two arguments: wife’s leisure 
and net family income. This simplification  is permissible if  the husband’s 
labor supply is perfectly inelastic. In fact, many econometric studies of 
the labor supply behavior of married men have tended to show that both 
18. See the excellent survey by Heckrnan et al. 22  Daniel R. FeenberglHarvey S. Rosen 
wageI9 and income effects are small in  absolute value.20  We therefore 
adopt the simpler model as a reasonable first approximation of  reality. 
Now that we have decided upon the arguments for the utility function, 
we turn to the question of its functional form. In making a selection, two 
criteria are important: (i) it should be simple, both to limit computational 
costs and to facilitate intuitive understanding of  the results; and (ii) it 
should be broadly consistent with econometric estimates of  the labor 
Recently, Hausman (1980) suggested that one way  to satisfy these 
criteria is to start with a labor function that fits the data fairly well and 
then take advantage of  duality theory to find the underlying (indirect) 
utility function. More specifically, Hausman  observes that the linear 
labor supply function has proved very useful in explaining labor supply 
behavior: 
(3.1)  H=aw+bA+s, 
where His  annual hours of work, w is the net wage, A is effective income, 
and a, b, and s are parameters.  Using Roy's  identity, which relates 
various derivatives of  the indirect utility function to H,  Hausman shows 
that the indirect utility function v(w,A)  underlying (3.1) is 
supply  - 
Given the ranges over which a particular individual's o  and A will vary 
in our simulations, equations (3.1) and (3.2) seem to be adequate approx- 
imations, and they are adopted for use in this paper. We assign each 
family  a set of  utility function parameters  calculated so that  current 
behavior is perfectly predicted by  equation (3.1).  Specifically, assume 
that the hours elasticity with respect to the wage for tlhe ith family is $'and 




19. This includes own and cross wage effects. For households in which the wife is the 
primary earner, i.e. her earnings exceed the husband's, the wife's labor supply is assumed to 
be perfectly inelastic, as is the husband's. 
20.  See, for example, Heckman et  al. (1979, pp. 11.28,11.34).  IHausman (1980) also finds 
a small wage effect but a fairly substantial income effect. 
21.  Clearly,  this procedure cannot be implemented  for noriworkers.  For  these indi- 
viduals, the following ad hoc procedure is used: calculate the aver age H, w,  and A members 
of the individual's AGI group who work between 0 and 100  hours per year. Substitute these 
means into system (3), and use the implied values of a, b, and s for the nonworkers. 23  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
s.  = H.  -  a.o.  -  b.A  (3.3c)  1  It 11’ 
Up to this point  we  have  discussed only the  behavior  of  married 
couples. There are,  of course, a substantial number of households headed 
by men and women without a spouse present. Not a great deal is known 
about  the labor supply patterns  of  such people.22  We  assume in our 
simulations that the work behavior of  these individuals is unaffected by 
the income tax. This assumption enables us to focus upon problems in the 
tax treatment of  married couples. It also builds a conservative bias into 
our estimates of  the aggregate behavioral  response to change in  the 
economic environment. 
Elasticity Estimates 
In order to solve equations (3.3), estimates of  wage and unearned 
income elasticities for married women are required. The literature sug- 
gests fairly high values for the wage elasticity. The studies reviewed by 
Heckman, Killingsworth, and MaCurdy (1979) report values between 0.2 
and 1.35 (pp. 11.28, IV.3), and some investigators have proposed even 
larger estimates (see e.g. Bloch 1973  or Rosen 1976). There is virtually no 
guidance with respect to how the wage elasticity varies with income level. 
Indeed, because of  the thinness of  all statistical samples in very high 
income groups (i.e. family income greater than $35,000 in 1974), essen- 
tially nothing is known about the labor supply response of  the women at 
the top end of  the income scale. 
Since we do not know with any confidence how qyvaries with income, 
in a given simulation we simply assign all wives the same value. One set of 
simulations is performed with a value of  0.5 and another with 1.0. The 
results are contrasted to those which emerge when it is assumed that there 
is no behavioral response whatsoever to the tax system. 
Turning now to the setting of values for qf,  we find that here also the 
literature provides less than firm guidance. This is due in part to the 
problems involved in correctly measuring unearned family income. (Dif- 
ficulties arise from underreporting,  estimating imputed incomes from 
durable goods, etc.) In addition, unearned income is usually treated as an 
exogenous variable in hours equations, although theoretical considera- 
tions suggest that in  a life-cycle context, it  is endogenous. Heckman, 
Killingsworth, and MaCurdy (1979) report that most investigators have 
found values of qfbetween -  0.002 and -  0.2. We use a value of -  0.1 in 
our simulations. 
1.4  Results 
In this section we simulate the effects of four alternative approaches to 
the tax treatment of the family: (a)  an exemption from taxation of 25% of 
22.  Hausman (1980,  p. 53) reports  one study in which female heads of households have a 
substantial labor supply response and another in which the labor response is nil. 24  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
the first $10,000 of  secondary workers’ earnings, (b)  a tax credit of  10% 
on the first $10,000 of  secondary workers’ earnings, (c)  taxation of the 
husband and wife as single individuals, with the tax base of  each being 
half of  total family income (“income splitting”), (d)  choice between (i) 
taxation of the husband and wife as single individuals, with the tax base of 
each spouse being his or her own earnings plus one-half of  family un- 
earned income, or (ii) the status quo. 
Regimes a and b maintain the existing general framework for taxation 
of  the family. They can be viewed as attempts to ameliorate what some 
observers  consider  to  be  an  unduly  high  tax  burden  on  secondary 
earners.23  Regimes c and d represent more serious departures from the 
status quo. Under regime c, the tax unit is the individual, but tax liability 
is half of  family income. In effect,  then, all family income is split. Regime 
d represents a substantial attempt to make individuals rather than fami- 
lies the units of  taxation, because only unearned income is split. 
There are, of  course, an essentially unlimited number of  ways in which 
the tax treatment of  the family could be changed. We think that these 
four are of  considerable interest both for policy purposes and for demon- 
strating the capabilities of  our simulation model. 
Because there appears to be considerable concern about the impact of 
alternative tax regimes on wives’ labor supplies, the simulations of  this 
section focus only on the population of  married couples. Appendix B 
contains results for simulations with married and single people together. 
In order to keep the number of  tables manageable, we present in this 
appendix only results for the case where qw,  the uncompensated supply 
elasticity for wives, is 1.0. Appendix C has results for the more conserva- 
tive estimate of  0.5. 
Each tax regime naturally induces a change in revenue collections. It is 
possible that in practice legislators might want to introduce additional 
adjustments to keep tax revenues constant. However, one cannot know 
what form these adjustments  would take-changes in the rate schedules, 
deductions, and/or tax  credits are all  possibilities.  Indeed, at recent 
congressional hearings, it was suggested that revenue shortfalls gener- 
ated by changing the tax treatment of families be made up by a “windfall 
profits” tax on  oil. In addition,  there is no assurance that there would be a 
desire to maintain the tax collections associated with  the status quo. 
Legislators  might  want  to accompany  the tax  reform with  a  general 
increase or decrease  in  revenues.  In  the light  of  this  ambiguity,  we 
decided not to attempt here any revenue adjustments, although in future 
work we hope to develop some constant tax revenue estimates. 
The current tax regime provides the benchmark to which the various 
tax reform proposals are compared. The key information is given in table 
1.3. For  each  adjusted gross  income  (AGI) class,  the table shows 
23.  See, for example, Munnell (1980). Table 1.3  The Status Quo, 1979 
AGI  Hours  Fraction of  Married 
Class  Number of  Average  Tax  Marginal  Worked  Women Earning over 
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235  .22 
48 1  .36 
568  .34 
613  .43 
829  .51 
1,037  .64 
658  .45 
833  .17 
732  .45 
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Table 1.4  Exemption of 25% of First $lO,OOO  of 
Secondary Worker’s Earnings 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 
( x  $1,OOO)  behavior)  (q*= 1.0)  Tax Rate  per Year 
<5  -  49  -  49  -  .03  235 
5-10  17  20  .14  488 
1(F-15  919  920  .16  572 
15-20  1,705  1,717  .23  637 
20-30  2,776  2,817  .22  874 
30-50  5,877  5,992  .29  1,100 
50-100  15,922  16,114  .36  712 
>lo0  68,539  68,647  .52  853 
Means  3,594  3,637  .20  766 
Totals  1.753 x  10”  1.774 x  10”  ...  3.737 x  1O’O 
averages24  of  adjusted gross incomes, federal income tax liabilities, mar- 
ginal tax rates, and hours of  work per year supplied by wives, and their 
labor force participation rates. (Negative tax liabilities and marginal tax 
rates can arise because the 10% earned income credit is refundable.) As 
we expect, average and marginal tax rates tend to rise with AGI class. 
The number of hours worked tends to rise with income, but the relation is 
not strictly increasing. As other family income increases, there is  an 
income effect which tends to decrease the number of  hours that wives 
However, there is also a tendency for the wife’s pretax wage to be 
positively correlated with other family income, which encourages work in 
the market (assuming a positively sloped supply of hours schedule). One 
cannot say a priori which effect will dominate. 
We now examine how each proposal would change the status quo. 
1.4.1 
Table 1.4 shows the effects of allowing the family to deduct 25% of the 
first $10,000 of the wife’s earnings.26  In order to allow comparability with 
table 1.3, the adjusted gross income classes are those associated with the 
status quo. 
The exemption has a substantial impact on labor supply. As compari- 
son of  the last column with table 1.3 suggests, on average wives supply 
thirty-four more hours per year than they do under the current system. 
Exemption of 25% of Secondary Worker’s Earnings 
24.  Sample population weights are used to compute these and all other averages. 
25.  This is under the assumption that leisure is a normal good, which is consistent with 
both casual observation and econometric evidence. 
26.  This is similar in spirit to the Conable bill, H.R. 6822, which gives a 10% exemption 
to the first $20,000 of  the lower earner’s income but only if  the couple is subject to the 
marriage penalty. See Sunley (1980). 27  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
The increases are most marked in the higher-income brackets. For exam- 
ple, in the $50,00CL$100,000  AGI class, annual hours increase by slightly 
more than fifty. This is because the wives in the higher tax brackets 
experience the greatest increase in the net wage, ceteris paribus. 
On average, tax collections from couples fall by  about 5%.  In the 
middle-income ranges there is a tendency for the percentages decrease in 
tax liability to increase with income. For the sake of comparison, we have 
noted in the second column of  table 1.4 what the revenue predictions 
would have been had we postulated perfectly inelastic labor supplies for 
wives. The figures suggest that about one-fifth of  the shortfall in tax 
revenues is restored as a consequence of the increased tax base associated 
with higher labor supply. Although this is a far cry from the claims of 
some that tax reductions on earned income will be self-financing, it is 
enough of  a difference to demonstrate the importance of  allowing for 
endogenous behavioral responses. 
1.4.2  Tax Credit for 10% of  Secondary Workers' Earnings 
Under this regime, the family can deduct from its tax bill an amount 
equal to 10% of  the secondary worker's earnings up to a maximum of 
$10,000. The results are shown in table 1.5. The overall increase in labor 
supply induced by the credit is greater than that of  the 25% exemption. 
However, this result does not hold for each AGI class. In the two highest 
groups, work effort is less than under the exemption. The main reason for 
this is that at the top of  the income distribution, marginal tax rates are 
sufficiently  high that one-fourth the marginal tax rate gives a greater work 
incentive than the 10% tax credit. The cost of  generating the greater 
labor supply is a somewhat lower level of  tax revenues. 
Table 1.5  Tax Credit of  10% on First $lO,OOO  of 
Secondary Worker's  Earnings 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 
( x  $l,OOo)  behavior)  (qO= 1.0)  Tax Rate  per Year 
<5  -  61  -  61  -  ,046  243 
5-10  -8  -7  .12  516 
10-15  876  90 1  .15  612 
15-20  1,649  1,679  .21  673 
20-30  2,719  2,786  .23  91 1 
30-50  5,940  6,030  .31  1,103 
50-100  16,139  16,210  .38  690 
>lo0  68,631  68,670  .52  840 
Means  3,576  3,626  .22  793 
Totals  1.744 x  10"  1.768 x  10"  ...  3.867 x  10" 28  Daniel R. FeenberglHarvey S. Rosen 
Table 1.6  Splitting All Income 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 
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.22  910 
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1.4.3  Complete Income Splitting 
As we noted earlier, there is now considerable sentiment for the view 
that, at least for income tax purposes, married people should be treated 
as much as possible like single people. In this and the succeeding section, 
we consider the effects when both spouses face the tax schedule that is 
currently faced by single individuals. In this section, we assume that the 
tax base for each spouse is one-half of  total family income, both earned 
and unearned. Although we characterize this as “income splitting,” note 
that it differs from the conventional use of that term, because we not only 
divide income but apply a different rate schedule as well (i.e. the schedule 
that single persons currently face). In section 1.4.4 we assume that only 
unearned income is split. 
The income splitting results are shown in  table 1.6. As one would 
expect, tax revenues go down compared to the status quo-the  shortfall 
for couples  is  about $28  billion.  On the  average, hours of  work  by 
secondary workers increase by  about forty, but interestingly, for some 
income groups work effort actually falls. Despite the fact that income 
splitting generally leads to a substitution effect that increases labor sup- 
ply, there is also an income effect which tends to reduce it. Apparently, 
the substitution effect dominates in the upper-income groups, while in 
some of  the lower-income groups the income effect dominates. Even 
given very simple assumptions on the structure of preference, it is not safe 
to assume that labor supplies for different groups will change in the same 
direction. 
Because the current tax system tends to benefit married couples with 
only one earner, it is of  some interest to examine how the tax burdens of 
one- versus two-earner families2’  would change under this tax regime. 
minimum of  the earnings of  the two spouses is less than $1,000. 
27. To make this distinction operational, we define a single earner as one in which the 29  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
The  results are shown in table 1.7. Columns (2) and (3) show how income 
taxes change for two-earner families,  and (6) and (7)  give the same 
information for one-earner families. On average, tax liabilities for one- 
earner families fall by a slightly greater proportion than those for two- 
earner families. This somewhat surprising result occurs because the one- 
earner families benefit especially from the splitting of nonlabor income. 
1.4.4  Optional Single Filing 
This regime gives married couples two options. The first is for each 
spouse to file as an individual and face the same rate schedule as a single 
person. Each spouse’s tax base is the sum of  his or her earned income, 
plus one-half of  unearned family income. Deductions  and exemptions are 
allocated in proportion to  income.**  In principle, proponents of individual 
taxation would probably want to include in a given spouse’s tax base only 
the income deriving from his or  her property. This would be impractical, 
however, because (a) much property is jointly owned and (6) spouses 
might transfer property to each other in order to minimize the family tax 
burden. It seems to us that imposing equal division of unearned income is 
a reasonable way to proceed.2y 
The family’s second option is to continue filing jointly as it does under 
the current regime. The simulation program computes the utility level 
associated with each option (using equation [3.2]). The family is assumed 
to choose whichever option maximizes utility. 
The outcomes are shown in table 1.8. What is most striking about this 
regime is the increase in labor supply generated, an average increase of 
about eighty hours per year. At  the same time, tax revenues from couples 
fall by more than 10% as approximately half the families take advantage 
of  individual filing to lower their tax liabilities. 
Again, it is of  some  interest to  compare the effects of this tax regime on 
one- versus two-earner families. This can be done by consulting table 1.7. 
Columns (2) and (4)  indicate that tax liabilities for two-earner families 
fall by  about 13%; columns (6) and (8) suggest that tax liabilities for 
one-earner  families fall by only 8%. Although one-earner families gain to 
some extent by the ability to split unearned income, the major advan- 
tages go to  those couples who no longer have to pay the “marriage tax.” 
Another way to interpret table 1.7 is in terms of  the proportionate 
reductions  in tax burdens for one- versus two-earner  families. Under 
regime c,  58% of the tax cut goes to one-earner families. Regime d,  on 
the other hand, gives only 42% of the reduction to these families. One 
expects, then, that if  confronted with  the choice  between  complete 
28.  The Fenwick bill (H.R.  3609) would allocate each itemized deduction to the spouse 
who actually makes the payment. As Sunley (1980) points out, this would lead to great 
complications in tax planning. 
29.  In  contrast, the  Fenwick bill  would allocate unearned income  on  the basis  of 
ownership (see Sunley 1980). Table 1.7  One- versus Two-Earner Families under Regimes c and d 
Two-Earner Families  One-Earner Families 
Status  Taxes:  Taxes:  Status  Taxes:  Taxes: 
Average  Quo  Regime  Regime  Average  Quo  Regime  Regime 
AGI Class  AGI  Taxes  C  d  AGI  Taxes  C  d 








>  100 
Means 
Totals 
4,150  -  269 
8,079  224 
12,039  799 
17,646  1,798 
24,531  3,230 
35,555  6,121 
62,154  14,714 
169,465  62,532 
24,928  3,744 
5.678  X  10"  8.527 X  10" 
-  269 








7.355  x  10'0 
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-  269  2,649  12  5  12 
112  7,434  -64  -  422  -  69 
548  12,627  1,051  380  997 
1,449  17,333  1,834  1,528  1,673 
2,764  24,116  2,872  2,580  2,743 
5,447  38,300  6,959  6,087  6,685 
12,602  69,525  17,924  15,186  14,668 
55,795  180,285  70,013  63,422  63,105 
7.349 x  10"  6.119 x  10"  1.016 x  10"  8.539  x  10"  9.305 x  10" 
3,226  23,533  3,908  3,284  3,579 
~  ~~ 
Note:  Regime c is complete income splitting. Regime d is optional single filing. 
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Table 1.8  Optional Single Filing 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 
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-  - .03  235 
.13  522 
.I5  592 
.I9  692 
.22  932 
.28  1,162 
.29  829 
.47  872 
Means  3,327  3,414  .206  815 
Totals  1.623 X  10”  1.665 x  10”  ...  3.978 x  10’’ 
income splitting and optional single filing, one-earner families  would tend 
to support the former, ceteris paribus. 
1.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we simulated the effects of  alternative tax treatments of 
the family using a model which allows for the possibility of  tax-induced 
changes in labor supply behavior. In order to do so, several methodolog- 
ical problems had to be solved. It was especially important to develop a 
statistical procedure for imputing values to missing variables. We hope 
that our “random imputation” technique will be useful to  other investiga- 
tors in a wide variety of  applications. 
Using the statistical methodology, we examined tax reform proposals 
that represented  both  minor  and major  departures from  the current 
regime. These included various types of  preferential treatment for the 
earnings of secondary workers as well as new rules governing the impact 
of marriage upon filing status. In a number of cases, we found that failure 
to allow for an endogenous labor supply response would have led to 
substantial errors in the revenue estimates. This was true even though the 
behavioral elasticities we postulated were rather modest in size. 
We were often surprised about the directions and magnitudes of  the 
behavioral responses to tax changes. Despite the very simple preference 
structure that we postulated,  “back of  the envelope” estimates about 
what would happen in a given simulation often turned out to be wrong. In 
a complicated tax structure with discretely changing marginal tax rates, 
income effects can induce unexpected responses. 
In order to point out directions for future research, it is useful to 
consider some questions that a skeptical reader might raise. 32  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
1. What  about  the  labor  supply  response  of  husbands?  We  have 
assumed that the labor supply of  husbands is perfectly inelastic. As noted 
in section 1.3, this assumption is broadly consistent with the econometric 
literature. However, the possibility remains that for both sexes other 
dimensions of  labor supply-human  capital decisions, time of  retirement, 
choice of  occupation-might  be affected by  the tax system. Unfortu- 
nately, practically nothing is known about whether such effects exist.3o  As 
evidence on these issues begins  to accumulate, presumably  it can be 
incorporated into TAXSIM. 
2.  What about life-cycle effects? The foundation of  this paper has been 
the standard static model of  leisure-income choice. In theory, it would 
probably  be better to examine labor  supply decisions in a  life-cycle 
context. To do so, however, would complicate the analysis immensely, as 
well  as increase  our data requirements-longitudinal  data would  be 
required. If  a life-cycle analysis were successfully undertaken, it would 
allow  us to account for changes in the demographic structure of  the 
population, as well as to show how various tax policies affect individuals 
according to lifetime, rather than current, income classes. Although the 
lack of  a life-cycle perspective clearly limits the usefulness of our results 
for analyzing very long run effects, a shorter horizon is probably more 
relevant for the current policy discussion. 
3. What about general equilibrium considerations? Our simulations 
assume that pretax wages and interest rates remain constant despite the 
presence of  some substantial changes in labor supply. It would clearly be 
desirable to make gross factor returns endogenous. Unfortunately, if  we 
want detailed and careful information on tax burdens by income class, 
marital status, or virtually any other characteristic, a very large micro- 
data set is necessary. Setting up a useful general equilibrium model in this 
context currently appears infeasible.  It should be noted  that existing 
general equilibrium models of  tax incidence assume a relatively small 
number of  classes of individuals (see e.g. Fullerton, Shoven,  and Whalley 
1978). 
4. What about macroeconomic considerations? The previous question 
concerned how much the gross wage might change if  people desired to 
work more hours; here it is asked whether the hours  could be absorbed by 
the economy at all. It is beyond the scope of  this paper to develop a 
complete macroeconomic model of  the employment effects associated 
with tax reform. We merely note that a case can be made that with proper 
monetary and fiscal policies, additional labor supply could be absorbed 
by the ec~nomy.~'  Similarly, we have made no attempt to assess how the 
macroeconomic feedbacks due to changing tax revenues might affect our 
substantive results. 
30.  See Rosen (1980). 
31.  See, for example, Feldstein  (1972). 33  Alternative Tax Treatments of the Family 
Thus, although we believe that the simulations in this paper are suf- 
ficiently careful to be considered seriously in the debate on tax policy, a 
good deal of  work remains to be done. 
Appendix A 
About 70% of taxpayers in 1974  did not itemize their personal deductions 
(medical and dental expenses, interest payments, local taxes paid, etc.) 
but accepted instead the standard  deduction. The standard deduction was 
then 15% of  adjusted gross income with a minimum of  $1,300 and a 
maximum of  $2,000. Because some of  the tax code changes we study 
would affect the decision to itemize deductions, it is important that this 
decision be endogenous to the model. Hence we must make an estimate 
of  deductible expenses incurred by  nonitemizers.  The purpose of  this 
appendix is to explain how deductible expenses were imputed to non- 
itemized returns. 
Rather than use some extraneous  data source, we have simply assumed 
that the distribution of  deductible expenses follows a lognormal distribu- 
tion (conditional on income) and that the  parameters of  this function may 
be inferred from the truncated sample. With these parameters known, 
random deviates with the correct conditional distribution may be used as 
proxies for the unknown expenses. If  the distribution is correctly mod- 
eled and reflects the influence of  all the variables on the tax return, then 
our estimates of  tax rate (or any other functions of  items on the tax 
return) will be unbiased. 
This procedure ignores possible price effects of itemization on expendi- 
ture. This is permissible because we require only an estimate of deducti- 
ble expenses at the prices associated  with itemization  rather than an 
estimate of  actual deductible expenditures by nonitemizers. 
The probability of  a joint return showing itemized deductions depends 
strongly on income,  ranging from less than 1% at incomes less than 
$5,000 to more than 99% at incomes over $1 million, but it does not seem 
to relate to any other available variables. For example, our regressions 
indicated that the number of  dependents living at home, which might 
plausibly  influence mortgage interest and medical bills, did not signifi- 
cantly influence either the decision to itemize or the amount of  itemized 
deductions  for those  who  did  itemize. This result  appeared in  both 
ordinary least squares and Tobit equations. 
The sample was divided into nine income categories. It was assumed 
that for each category except the first (AGI less than $5,000) a truncated 
lognormal distribution characterized the observed distribution of deduc- 
tions. Two alternative means were used to recover the parameters of the 
untruncated  distribution: 34  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
1. Where the point of  truncation is known, Cohen (1951)32  provides 
formulas for estimating the mean and variance of an underlying distribu- 
tion from the first three moments of an observed truncated distribution. 
(Remarkably, these are in closed form.) If  vi is the ith moment of  the 
observed distribution and c is the truncation point, then 
u = c + (2v,v2 -  v3)/(2vf-  v2) 
and 
s = (v1v3 -  v$)/(2v1  -  Y2) 
are the estimates of  the mean and standard deviation of  the underlying 
normal distribution. Estimates are presented in table l.A.l, in the col- 
umns labeled “Cohen.” 
2.  The second approach to estimate u and s as parameters of  the 
regression 
1-  In  Di = u + - [F  ‘(Pi)]  + e , 
S 
where Di  is the amount deducted by  the jth household, F-  ‘(a)  is the 
inverse of  the cumulative normal distribution, and Pi  is the observed 
sample probability that D <  Dj.  These results are given in table l.A.l 
under the headings “regression.” 
It is comforting to note that at least in the middle-income categories 
where there is a nearly even split between itemizing and not itemizing, 
there is reasonable agreement between the results generated by the two 
procedures. However, neither procedure produced  (or was really ex- 
pected to produce) reasonable results in the lowest-income category, and 
here the values of  u = 6.5 and s = 0.5 were imposed. 
With the parameters u and s in hand, the actual imputations are quite 
straightforward. Let c equal the log of the standard deduction. Then the 
probability  of  not  itemizing is  F[(c -  u)/s]. Now  let  x  be  a random 
variable distributed uniformly on the interval [0,1]. Then {F-  ‘(x)s + u} 
is a normal random deviate with mean u and standard deviation s, and 
{F-  ‘(xF[(c -  u)/sJ) + u}  is a random deviate from the truncated distribu- 
tion below the point of  truncation. The imputations are found, then, by 
having the computer generate values for x,  and substituting values of  u 
and s from table l.A.l. It turned out that the imputations using the 
parameters from procedure 2 seemed more reasonable than those from 
Cohen’s method, so the former were used. 
32.  The formula  for the mean given here differs from that given in Cohen’s paper 
because of  a typographical error in that paper. This error is unfortunately perpetuated by 
Johnson and Kotz (1970). Table l.A.l  The Distribution of  Deductible Expenses by  Income Class 
Estimated 
Estimated Mean (p)  Standard Deviation(s)  Median 
Income  Itemized  Mean 
(x %1,0oo)  Cohen  Regression  Cohen  Regression  Deductions;  AGI 
5  ...  ...  t..  ...  0  3,795 
s10  8.01  7.28  ,167  ,596  0  8,199 
10-15  8.10  7.75  .34  .527  0  12,706 
15-20  8.31  8.21  .2  .373  8.03  17,456 
20-50  8.53  8.40  ,133  ,497  8.43  27,503 
50-100  9.24  9.18  ,602  ,655  9.22  66,562 
100-500  9.89  9.89  ,804  ,910  9.88  154,225 
500-1,000  11.51  11.28  1.24  1.27  11.53  674,093 
1  WJ  12.19  12.32  .616  1.38  12.27  1,952,799 
*Median of log of itemized deductions for each income class, computed directly from the data. The  value of zero is assigned for classes in which less than half 
the sample itemized deductions. 36  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
Appendix B 
In the text, we report simulation results only for the subsample consisting 
of married couples. This is in order to focus attention on the impact of 
taxation on wives’ labor supply. Of course, for revenue projection pur- 
poses, the entire sample is relevant, and these results are presented here. 
Table 1.A.2 has information for the current system. Table 1.A.3  shows 
how tax revenues vary by adjusted gross income class for each of the tax 
regimes described in section 1.4.  We show revenues assuming both (a) no 
behavioral  response and (b)  wage and income elasticities of  1.0 and 
-  0.1, respectively, for married women. 
Appendix C 
We argued in the text that for married women’s hours of work, values of 
1  .0 and -  0.1 are reasonable estimates of the wage and income elastici- 
ties, respectively. Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to redo the simula- 
tions assuming a more conservative value of  0.5 for the wage elasticity. 
The results are reported in tables 1.A.4-1.A.7. There is an exact corre- 
spondence between these tables and tables 1.4-1.8 of the text. Both sets 
of  tables look at the same tax regimes as they affect the subsample of 
married couples. The only difference is in the assumed value of the wage 
elasticity. 
For regimes a and b,  the results barely differ from their counterparts in 
section  1.4. Because  these  regimes do not  induce major  changes in 
marginal tax rates, the particular value of the wage elasticity of  supply is 
not of  major importance. On the other hand, regimes c and d are much 
Table 1.A.2  The Status Quo,  1979 (marrieds and singles) 
AGI Class  Average  Tax  Marginal 
(x  $1,100)  Returns  AGI  Liability  Tax Rate 
<5  6,323,365  2,173  -  18  -  .01 
5-10  13,520,001  7,595  379  .18 
10-15  17,197,557  12,431  1,278  .21 
30-50  9,899,335  36,829  6,719  .35 
>  100  510,856  180,072  69,576  .55 
15-20  1  1,502,705  17,420  1,983  .27 
2G30  17,500,605  24,117  3,192  .27 
50-100  1,800,712  66,166  16,795  .42 
Means  ...  19,530  3,042  ,235 
Totals  78,255,136  1.528 X  10”  2.380  X  10” Table l.A.3  Tax Revenues under Alternative Tax Regimes (marrieds and singles) 
~~  ~ 
Regime a*  Regime b*  Regime c*  Regime d* 
Tax  Tax  Tax  Tax 
Liability  Tax  Liability  Tax  Liability  Tax  Liability  Tax 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Liability  (exogenous  Liability  (exogenous  Liability  (exogenous  Liability 
( x  $1 ,OOO)  behavior)  (qW=  1.0)  behavior)  (yU= 1.0)  behavior)  (yW=  1.0)  behavior)  (qW=  1.0) 
<5  -  18  ~  18  -  18  -  20  -  19  -  19  -  18  -  18 
5-10  372  373  380  364  255  262  357  366 
10-15  1,257  1,255  1,279  1,236  959  948  1,211  1,219 
15-20  1,900  1,909  1,983  1,859  1,720  1,712  1,790  1,805 
20-30  2,949  2,985  3,193  2,900  2,895  2,970  2,850  2,930 
30-50  6,227  6,330  6,720  6,284  5,962  6,034  6,075  6,243 
5S100  16,279  16,452  16,794  16,479  14,388  14,691  13,942  14,263 
>  100  69,403  69,502  69,576  69,487  63,613  63,617  62,964  63,301 
Means  2,893  2,920  3,042  2,882  2,654  2,684  2,727  2,781 
Totals  2.264 x  10"  2.285 x  10"  2.380 x  10"  2.255 x  10"  2.077 x  10"  2.101  x  10"  2.134  x  10"  2.177  x  10" 
*Regime a: Exemption of  25% of  first $10,000 of  secondary worker's earnings. Regime b: Tax credit of  10% on the first 10% of  secondary worker's 
earnings. Regime c: Complete income splitting. Regime d:  Optional individual filing. 38  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
more effective at reducing tax rates, and the wage elasticity becomes 
more relevant. 
By construction, the behavioral responses in this appendix are muted 
compared to their counterparts in section 1.4.  However, it is striking that 
allowing for even a very mild behavioral response has significant effects 
on both tax revenues and hours of  work. 
Table 1.A.4  Exemption of 25% of First $lO,OOO 
of Sesondary Worker's Earnings 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 




















1.753 x  10" 
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3.737 x  1O'O 
Table 1.A.5  Tax Credit of  10% on First $10,000 































Marginal  Worked 
Tax Rate  per Year 
-  ,046  239 
.12  495 
.14  591 
.21  643 
.22  869 
.31  1,072 
.37  675 
.52  837 
Means  3,576  3,601  .22  762 
Totals  1.744 x  10"  1.756  x  10"  ...  3.72  x  10"' 39  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
Table l.A.6  Splitting All Income 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 








>  100 
Means 
Totals 
-  54 








1.566 x  10" 
-  54 








1.577 x  10'' 
-  .03 


















3.670 x  10"' 
Table 1.A.7  Optional Single Filing 
Tax Liability  Hours 
AGI Class  (exogenous  Tax Liability  Marginal  Worked 
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1.623 x  10" 
-  -  49 



























3.796 x  10'" 
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Comment  David A. Wise 
Feenberg  and  Rosen  have  presented  an  approach to simulating the 
effects that changes in the tax code would have on tax revenue  and 
women’s labor supply. I say women’s labor supply because the authors 
assume in this paper that husbands are not affected by the changes they 
analyze. Those aspects of  their procedure that are interesting also pro- 
voke questions about the preferred procedure to use in making inferences 
like theirs, an issue to which I will return later. The authors have chosen 
to use as a base for their analysis a sample of tax returns. Thus they begin 
with good information on earnings. But they do not have information on 
the components of earnings: wage rates and hours worked. Their prob- 
lem is to describe the budget constraint faced by the family, assuming that 
the husband’s earnings are exogenous. To do this, they must predict the 
wife’s wage rate and then use the tax code-or a hypothetical one-to 
“predict” the budget constraint faced by the family. 
I shall first present a simple outline of  the Feenberg-Rosen procedure 
and use it as a framework within which to make specific comments. I shall 
then make more general remarks and comment on the simulation results. 
The procedure with respect to a family i may be described as follows: 
1.  Assume husband’s earnings given. 
2. Predict wife’s wage rate 
David A. Wise is Stambaugh Professor of  Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy 
School of  Government at Harvard  University  and  a research associate  at  the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research. 42  Daniel R.  Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
1. 
variables common to  random draw from 
V9i =f TAXSIM and PSID  +  empirical residual  (  1(  distribution 
3. Predict wife’s hours 
fii = (earnings from TAXSIM)i + fii 
4. Describe baseline family budget constraint using tax code and hus- 
5. Assume  parametric  form  of  labor  supply and associated utility 
band’s earnings. 
functions 
H=  aw + bA +s,  v(w,  A) 
a  as 
b  b2  b 
= (A  + -  w - -  + -)ebw . 
6. Assume “representative” wage and income elasticities -qw and qA 
from the literature and choose values of  a,  b,  s to satisfy 
aiV91 -  b;Ai. 
7.  Predict baseline tax revenue ti‘ using model and tax code. 
8. Use actual tax revenue fy  given in TAXSIM. 
9.  Define residual 
10. Predict tax revenue t:l under new regime using model and “new” 
11. Take tax revenue under new regime to be 
tax code. 
i.., = c+  Ul! . 
12. Aggregate over i’s. 
To assume  no  response  by  husbands  (step 1) seems to me  to be 
defensible in an initial analysis of  the problem. But given the relatively 
small behavioral impact on the simulation results, I am not confident that 
the effect of husbands’ behavioral responses could ultimately be treated 
as a small part of  the total. The income maintenance experiments, for 
example, identified a significant labor supply response by heads of fami- 
lies to changes in tax codes, especially changes in unearned income (to 
which the authors’ results are not directed). 
Steps 2 through 4 randomly assign a budget constraint to the family, 
with the randomness coming from the predicted wage rate in step 2. Step 
2 is one of  the interesting aspects of  their procedure, although I found 43  Alternative Tax Treatments of  the Family 
their long discussion of  it unnecessary. The explicit treatment of  the 
disturbance term is important because the tax-imposed budget constraint 
is nonlinear. Without the addition to the expected wage rate of  a draw 
from the disturbance distribution, the range of  budget constraints would 
be narrower than the empirically observed range and, concomitantly, 
high and low marginal tax rates would be underepresented. 
Whether it is important to draw from the empirical residual distribu- 
tion depends on its shape. If the distribution is nonsymmetric, it may be 
important; if  not, simply using the estimated variance (from a regression 
package, for example) would probably do quite well. 
Then the authors suppose that  Hj results from optimizing a utility 
function of  the form set forth in step 5. 
A weak link in the authors’ procedure I believe is the method they use 
to assign values to the parameters in the utility function. They choose 
estimated wage and income elasticities (qw  and qA)  from the literature 
and then used the relations in step 6 to determine the utility function (and 
labor supply function) parameters for the family. The problem with this 
process it seems to me is that the pieces are basically not compatible. 
The utility function is one used by  Hausman. But he allows bi to be 
random across individuals and assumes ai  to be constant; his procedure 
estimates the parameter aj  and a mean and variance forb;. With nonlinear 
budget constraints, elasticities are ill defined because they depend on 
which segment  of  the budget  constraint  one is  on. Thus, under  the 
assumptions to this point, there would be no single qw  and q‘.  Nonethe- 
less, Feenberg and Rosen choose values for them and using the previ- 
ously estimated  and  assign to each individual both an aj  and a bj; both 
become random across individuals. Also, Hausman’s use of  the func- 
tional form in step 5 assumes that w is the net wage and A is “as if” or 
“virtual” income. Elasticities from the literature are normally not consis- 
tent with these definitions. Thus the Feenberg-Rosen process seems to be 
trying to fit together pieces that are at odds with one another. It is hard to 
know how to interpret their results. 
In addition, if  one is going to use the functional form in step 5,  then one 
should use parameter estimates for ai and b; that “fit” the data, given this 
functional form. An alternative to step 6 that may be more consistent 
with step 5 would be to use an estimate of  a; and a choice of  bj  from its 
estimated distribution-based  on estimates using this functional form- 
to assign a utility function to each person. This would be more appealing 
if  the simulations were based on the data used for estimation. Here they 
are not. 
The authors, of  course, have no information on women who do not 
work. For this group, they assign the same utility function parameters 
that they assign to persons working 0 to 100 hours. I believe that this 
assumption is likely to be quite far from reality because much of the labor 44  Daniel R. Feenberg/Harvey  S. Rosen 
supply response to a tax change may come through its effect on  participa- 
tion. Because there are likely to  be substantial fixed costs connected  with 
working, persons who do not work may on average be quite different 
from those who work even a little. In particular, with the parameters 
assumed  to be random  across  persons, those  who  do not work  are 
concentrated among persons with parameter values at the tails of  the 
distributions.  On average, those who work a little are likely to have 
values that differ substantially from the tail average. 
Having selected a budget constraint (steps 2 through 4) and having 
selected a utility function (steps 5 and 6), the authors in step 7 predict- 
on the basis of the budget constraint, the utility function, and the tax 
code-the  baseline tax revenue, observed in the tax file. The difference 
between the observed and the predicted baseline revenue yields a re- 
sidual ul (steps 8 and 9). The residual is due entirely to error in the 
prediction of the wife’s earnings, since the husband’s earnings are taken 
as given. The tax revenue under a new hypothesized regime (step 11) is 
taken to be the predicted revenue-based  on the model and the new tax 
code-plus  a term equal to the error ui in prediction of  the baseline 
revenue. Although the authors take this to be an unbiased estimate, it is 
unbiased only if the entire residual is taken to represent a fixed effect with 
respect to alternative tax regimes. This may be a reasonable assumption 
to make as long as the time period is presumed to be unchanged. Other- 
wise, under a new regime in a different time period, the large transitory 
component of  earnings would substantially  reduce the correlation be- 
tween the two residuals. 
I have also a few general comments with respect to the procedure. The 
prediction  of  wage rates using the residual  distribution (although not 
necessarily the empirical one) is certainly necessary in this context. But 
this is only an intermediate stage in the process; it does not represent a 
distribution over possible final outcomes-tax  revenue in particular. It is 
bothersome because the error in this step interacts with the error in the 
choice of  utility function parameters and in the prediction of  tax revenue, 
but in an ill-defined way. This is particularly  true with respect to the 
choice of  utility function parameters, which seems unconvincing to  me. It 
is troublesome because the pieces here do  not fit together in a way that 
allows easy understanding of the effects of the assumptions on the out- 
come, a property that would be appealing in a simulation paper. The 
simulations themselves do not address the issue. 
These problems of  course arise from the need to splice together two 
data sources. Feenberg and Rosen must choose the parameters of a utility 
function, but are not able to select parameters that fit the data. Thus a 
general question that comes to mind is whether it is best to follow the 
authors’ route or to base estimation and simulations on the same data 
source. The Feenberg-Rosen approach  has the distinct  advantage of Table C1.l  Tabulation from Feenberg-Rosen Results 
Regime 
Status  No Behavioral  With Behavioral 
Quo  Response  Response 
(a)  25% exemption 
of  1st $lO,OOo 
of  wife's 
earnings 
(b)  10% credit on 
1st $10,000 
of  wife's 
earnings 
(c)  Income 
splitting 
(d)  Single indi- 
vidual taxa- 






T)=  .5 





















1.753 (-6.2%  re 1) 
1.744 (-6.7%  re 1) 
1.566 (- 16.2% re 1) 
1.623 (- 13.2% re  1) 
(3) 












+ 1.6% re 1-2) 
+7.6% re 1-2) 




Source:  Feenberg and Rosen's tables 1.3-1.8 and 1.A.4-1.A.7. 
Notes:  R = total tax revenue; H = wife's annual hours worked; q = life's wage elasticity; re = with respect to. The actual revenue figures are the amount 
shown times 10". 46  Daniel R.  Feenberg/Harvey S. Rosen 
accurate baseline tax data. It is difficult to evaluate the estimation of 
labor supply response in the model, however. I suspect the possible error 
here could be very substantial. (This is especially troublesome since the 
simulated  behavioral  responses are relatively  small and the reported 
simulations based on different wage elasticities lead to very similar re- 
sults. Whether this reflects reality or only their model is unclear.) 
An  alternative approach is to  fit a utility function (like that in step  5)  to 
data on wage rates and hours worked-determining  the budget constraint 
by the tax code-and  then to simulate  outcomes  under a new code, based 
on that sample and the utility function parameters that fit it best. This is 
the procedure followed by Hausman, for example. This procedure has 
the advantage of internal consistency, and it is easy to check the effect of a 
different parameter assumption on the simulated outcomes. Its short- 
coming is that such data that are available do not represent a random 
sample of  tax files and it may not be straightforward to weight them so 
that they do. In addition, these data sets do not contain tax payments, so 
that accurate baseline tax revenue data are not available. More experi- 
mentation  would  help  determine  the  ultimate  accuracy  of  the  two 
approaches. 
Finally, I have a few comments on the simulation results themselves. 
From the Feenberg-Rosen results I have put together a summary tabula- 
tion (table C1.l). According to these results, of the four regimes simu- 
lated, if  there were no behavioral  response, tax revenue would be re- 
duced by 6 to 16%. Of these amounts, from  2 to 18% is accounted for by 
the estimated labor supply response. 
The change in  wage  elasticity  from  1 to 0.5 has what  to me is  a 
surprisingly small effect on the results. It has 110  effect under regime a. 
Under regime 6 it reduces hours of work by 3.9%. The authors explain 
the result  by  arguing  that  their hypothetical  regimes  do not change 
marginal tax rates very much, but income splitting presumably would. 
However, under their regime c,  the change in wage elasticity from 1 to  0.5 
reduces simulated hours of  work by  only 2.5%. 
Given the tenuous  nature of the assumptions of  the model, I would like 
to see many more simulations that would allow some evaluation of  how 
sensitive the results are to the assumptions. I would also like to see some 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the assumed income elasticity. At least 
in the income maintenance experiments, the income effect of tax changes 
was in general more important than the wage effect. 